


## Bayes Rule Example – The “Lemons Problem”

$$\Pr(A|B) = P(A,B) / P(B)$$



Ex-Ante, the seller knows the true quality of the car (if it's good or a lemon). The buyer only know the distribution of lemons in the entire population of used cars ( $\frac{1}{2}$  of all cars are good and  $\frac{1}{2}$  are lemons).

Ex-Post, the buyer should update his beliefs using Bayes rule. We need to find the  $p$  and the  $q$  in the above extensive game with imperfect information.

First off, we know the seller does not offer good cars for \$5,000. Hence if the Buyer sees a price of \$5,000 he should be certain ( $pr = 1$ ) that the car is a lemon. Confirm with Bayes rule:

$$q = \Pr(\text{Car is a lemon} \mid \text{Price} = \$5000) = \Pr(\text{Lemon}, \$5000) / \Pr(\$5000) = \frac{1}{2} * \frac{3}{4} / (\frac{1}{2} * 0 + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{3}{4}) = 1$$

Of course  $1-q = 0$  is the probability that the car is good if the price is \$5000 which never happens:

$$1-q = \Pr(\text{Car is good} \mid \text{Price} = \$5000) = \Pr(\text{Good}, \$5000) / \Pr(\$5000) = 0 / (\frac{1}{2} * 0 + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{3}{4}) = 0$$

What if the price is \$15000? By Bayes rule:

$$p = \Pr(\text{Car is good} \mid \text{Price} = \$15000) = \Pr(\text{Good}, \$15000) / \Pr(\$15000) = \frac{1}{2} * 1 / (\frac{1}{2} * 1 + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{4}) = \frac{4}{5}$$

And finally,

$$1-p = \Pr(\text{Car is a lemon} \mid \text{Price} = \$15000) = \Pr(\text{Lemon}, \$15000) / \Pr(\$15000) = \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{4} / (\frac{1}{2} * 1 + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{4}) = \frac{1}{5}$$

So given the seller's probabilities of each offer and the initial distribution of cars in the population, these  $p$ 's and  $q$ 's are the buyers updated (ex-post) beliefs about the quality of the car for sale.